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Mainly as a follow-up to public debate
about Switzerland’s role in World War
II, interest in Swiss relations with South
Africa’s apartheid regime (1948–1994)
was revived during the late 1990s. In res-
ponse to this public attention, in May
2000 the Federal Council commissioned
the Swiss National Science Foundation to
carry out a National Research Program
(NRP 42+) on Swiss-South African rela-
tions during the apartheid era. Arecently
concluded research project at the CIS
was part of the NRP 42+ and investiga-
ted the Swiss Government’s foreign
policy toward apartheid South Africa in
a longitudinal analysis. The study 
showed that the steadfastness of this
policy can mainly be explained by the
fact that various bureaucratic, political,
economic, and social circles exhibited
high convergence in their opposition to
economic sanctions against the apart-
heid regime – albeit for different reasons.
The research project was carried outby the Research Unit on Policy
Analysis & Evaluation of the Department
of Political Science at the University of
Zurich. The project investigated Swiss
foreign policy toward South Africa, start-
ing with Switzerland’s participation at the
United Nations’ 1968 Human Rights
Conference and ending with the abolition
of apartheid and the first free democratic
elections in South Africa in 1994. The
main research questions addressed how
Swiss policy toward South Africa was
designed and how observed patterns of
consistency and change in the policy
design can be explained. Policy design, as
it is understood here, refers not only to
policy content but also to the processes in
the political system that generate a given
policy. The study focused on political
ideas and convictions and thus sought to
explain the impact of attitudes, values and
problem perception patterns of political
actors on policy design. This orientation
motivated the decision to apply the
“Advocacy Coalition Framework” devel-
oped by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C.
Smith as an analytic framework. Using
this framework, two basic principles
(“policy core beliefs” according to the
Advocacy Coalition Framework) that
decisively influenced Swiss foreign poli-
cy toward South Africa throughout the
entire period studied were identified: con-
demnation of the apartheid system in
moral terms and rejection of economic
sanctions as a matter of principle. 
Until the mid-1980s, the policy of moral
condemnation was based on a Swiss dec-
laration at the UN Human Rights Confer-
ence of 1968 that denounced apartheid as
contradictory of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. In the context of
Switzerland’s normally very reserved
stance on the international stage at the
time, the declaration of 1968 was formu-
lated in an astonishingly sharp manner. But
the UN Human Rights conference in gen-
eral and the Swiss declaration in particular
attracted little attention at home in Switzer-
land. Still, the “moral condemnation” of
apartheid that constituted the centerpiece
of this declaration would provide the basis
for the Federal Council’s policy on this
issue throughout the 1970s and 1980s, both
at international conferences and in its
responses to parliamentary initiatives and
public protest against Switzerland’s offi-
cial  policy on South Africa.
The rejection of economic sanctions, the
second pillar of Swiss policy toward the
apartheid regime, was consistent from the
outset of international discussions on the
issue in the 1970s. Justification for the
Swiss position was based on three main
arguments: 
1) Switzerland’s established practice of not
participating in sanctions imposed by indi-
vidual states or groups of states, 
2) the conviction that sanctions are not an
appropriate means to bring about political
change, and 
3) the observation that, even if sanctions
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actually work, they often punish the wrong
party. 
The Federal Council made these points in
September 1986 in response to several par-
liamentary interventions on the topic,
many of which highlighted the fact that
most Western countries had adopted sanc-
tions against South Africa by this point.
The declaration of 1986 made the contrast
between Switzerland’s policy and the
emphasis of other Western states on tangi-
ble measures even more distinct, even
though the states resorting to sanctions
applied them above all to sectors where
they expected only minor or no negative
consequences for their own economies.
Both of these core beliefs were supported
by a broad coalition spanning the Federal
Council, the federal administration, the par-
liamentary majority, center-right parties,
and business circles. They even remained
consistent at the beginning of the 1990s,
when the Swiss Federal Council approved
the export of sixty Pilatus PC-7 aircrafts to
South Africa, despite the fact that the UN
sanctions committee spoke of a breach of
the UN weapons embargo of 1977. In
response, the Federal Council and the par-
liamentary majority contended that the PC-
7 did not amount to war material and was
therefore not covered by Switzerland’s
1963 weapons embargo against South
Africa. 
Once again, this discussion was character-
ized by the typical array of opponents and
supporters of sanctions: on the one hand, a
broad coalition from the Federal Council,
the parliamentary majority, center-right
parties, and business circles were commit-
ted to safeguarding free trade and individ-
ual responsibility to the greatest extent
possible. On the other, a political minority
drawn from left-wing parties and the peace
movement demanded stronger regulation
of international trade and greater solidarity
from Swiss foreign policy. Indeed, an
increasingly politicized and culturally
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law in the Iraq case was undisputed. The
legal verdict in the South African case, on
the other hand, was less clear-cut, and the
human-rights violations of the apartheid
regime had long been regarded as a South
African “domestic matter.”
Moreover, Swiss economic interests in Iraq
and Kuwait were marginal at the time of
Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait, whereas
established business relationships between
Switzerland and South Africa were strong
enough to mobilize businesses and sectors
that viewed the prospect of sanctions as a
direct threat.
Furthermore, the sudden international cri-
sis in Iraq during 1990 simplified a refor-
mulation of policy on the sanctions issue in
Switzerland. Switzerland perceived no
such crisis situation involving South Africa
that would have facilitated a similarly dra-
matic policy reversal.
Finally, generational factors, particularly
within the diplomatic corps, played an
important role due to the timing and rela-
tive urgency of both decisions. Whereas
Swiss officials were under pressure to
respond quickly to Iraq’s annexation of
Kuwait, which happened to coincide with
a Swiss holiday period when most senior
civil servants were absent, established
actors with firmly set attitudes steered the
design of Switzerland’s policy toward
South Africa.
The project was based on an analysis of
documents from various Swiss federal
departments from 1967 to 1994, supple-
mented by 22 guideline-based interviews
with former and current Swiss diplomats,
representatives of the federal administra-
tion, Parliament, and scholars. During the
end phase of the project, research efforts
were complicated by the Swiss Federal
Council’s decision of 16 April 2003 to
restrict access to archive files (due to the
threat of class-action lawsuits against nine
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Swiss companies – including Novartis,
Nestlé, the UBS and Credit Suisse – in the
United States by victims of the former
South African regime). Minutes of meet-
ings of the parliamentary committees on
foreign policy were available for the
research team as was the archive of the
Swiss Anti-Apartheid Movement. The full
research report (in German) will be pub-
lished shortly. A journal article is also in
preparation.  ■
For more information please write to:
Dr. Thomas Widmer
thow@pwi.unizh.ch
Christian Hirschi
chirschi@ku.edu
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important anti-apartheid movement had
meanwhile taken root in Switzerland.
However, it never achieved the political
strength in parliament or vis-à-vis the fed-
eral administration that it needed to bring
about change on this issue.
Economic sanctions were soundly rejected
within the very heterogeneous majority
coalition, though in part for very different
reasons. Although the majority coalition at
times concentrated on traditional concerns
of free trade and commerce and the need to
refrain from interfering with the “invisible
hand” of the market, pragmatic arguments
emphasizing the ineffectiveness of sanc-
tions tended to outweigh ideological rea-
soning. A further argument to reject sanc-
tions was based on a deductive derivation
from the principles of neutrality and uni-
versality that traditionally characterize
Swiss foreign policy. Finally, on the
extreme political right, racist sympathy for
the apartheid system was certainly also a
factor. These various convictions partly
complemented each other and were also
present in combination among certain indi-
viduals and organizations.
The Federal Council first introduced a sig-
nificant change in the Swiss position
toward economic sanctions in 1990 when
it imposed its first comprehensive eco-
nomic embargo against Iraq and Kuwait –
i.e., when Switzerland still rejected eco-
nomic sanctions against South Africa as a
matter of principle. It is indeed difficult to
compare these very different cases. Bind-
ing UN sanctions were never imposed
against South Africa – in contrast to Iraq in
August 1990 – with the exception of the
weapons embargo of 1977. In the South
African case, modification of the tried-
and-true policy remained out of the ques-
tion at the beginning of the 1990s. Never-
theless, the analysis shows that very
different forces were at work in the case of
the Swiss decision to impose sanctions
against Iraq: The breach of international
